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PROHIBITING PAYMENTS TO SURROGATE
MOTHERS: LOVE'S LABOR LOST AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION

Recent scientific advances have removed some of the legal obstacles that have traditionally precluded surrogate motherhood as a
means of procreation for most American families.' These developments have provided new hope of family life to the growing number
of married couples who are unable to have children on their own,'
and who are unwilling to suffer the long wait and uncertainties of
adoption.3 A major obstacle to surrogate motherhood, however, remains. Universally-enacted laws prohibiting baby selling arguably
make it illegal to pay a surrogate mother for her services." This comment argues that such laws, when applied in the context of surrogate motherhood, unconstitutionally infringe the right of privacy of
any couple seeking to have a child with a surrogate mother. In part
one, this comment analyzes the legal, scientific and social developments that have given rise to the recent increased demand for surrogate motherhood services. In part two, this comment discusses the
constitutionality of payment prohibitions to surrogate mothers, and
reaches the following conclusions. First, the right of privacy protects
a married couple's decision to have children through surrogate
motherhood. Second, laws prohibiting payments to surrogate
mothers infringe this right.' Third, the only state interests that are
sufficiently compelling to justify this infringement are the protection
of the parties to the relationship and to any child born from it."
1. For a discussion of some of these new technological developments, see infra
text accompanying notes 41 to 61.
2. Included among these couples are those who are physically unable to have
children, as well as those who, while physically able, encounter lifestyle obstacles to
pregnancy. See infra text accompanying notes 36 to 37.
3. For a brief discussion of the obstacles facing couples who seek to adopt, see
infra text accompanying notes 38 to 40.
4. For a brief discussion of the baby-selling argument, see infra text accompanying notes 63 to 65.
5. For a discussion of the proposition that a married couple's decision to have
children through surrogate motherhood is protected from governmental interference
by the constitutional right of privacy, see infra text accompanying notes 86 to 121.
6. For a discussion that laws prohibiting such payments effectively infringe the
couple's right to decide to engage in surrogate motherhood, see infra text accompanying notes 121 to 134.
7. For a discussion of the possible state interests that would justify infringing
the couple's right to engage in surrogate motherhood, see infra text accompanying
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Fourth, the state can employ means of achieving these interests that
are less restrictive of the married couple's right of privacy than a
complete prohibition on payments.8 Payment prohibitions are,
therefore, unconstitutional as applied to surrogate mothers.
1.

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: RECENT SCIENTIFIC LEGAL AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENTS

A.

A Laborious Task

For surrogate motherhood to be successful, three conditions are
necessary. First, the parties to the surrogate motherhood process
must be able to arrange for the conception and birth of a child."
Second, before actually doing so, the parties must reach an agreement defining what their respective rights and duties will be both
before and after the child is born.'0 Third, the parties must have
some means by which to enforce these rights and duties so as to
ensure performance."'
To begin this process, a married couple identifies and contacts a
woman who is willing to act as a surrogate mother for their child.
This may be as simple as convincing a family member, such as a
wife's sister, to undertake the responsibility. 2 Increasingly, however,
it is more common for a couple to hire a lawyer or private agency
that specializes in locating and screening women willing to serve as
surrogates."3
notes 135 to 185.
8. For a discussion of whether the state is obliged to utilize a less restrictive
means of achieving its interests and whether such means are available, see infra text
accompanying notes 186 to 209.
9. Traditionally, this was achieved by the contracting husband engaging in intercourse with the surrogate, who would carry the child to term. See, e.g., GENESIS
16:1-15. Modern surrogate motherhood, however, is achieved without intercourse
through either artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization. For an explanation of
these scientific processes, see infra text accompanying notes 44-61.
10. These include what the surrogate's duties are regarding insemination, abortion, health care, and transferral of parental rights, and what the contracting couples'
duties are regarding providing for the surrogate during the term of her pregnancy.
For a sample of a surrogate motherhood contract setting forth such rights and duties,
see Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract To Bear A Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (198182); Comment, Contract to Bear A Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1978).
11. Under current law, these contracts are arguably unenforceable because they
seek to do something that is illegal, i.e., pay a surrogate money for her services. For a
discussion that argues that such laws are unconstitutional as applied to surrogate
motherhood, see infra text at notes 68 to 209.
12. For examples of women who have performed gratuitiously as surrogate
mothers for close relatives and friends, see O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A
Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 127, 131 n.30 (1966).
13. One of the leading lawyers in the field is Noel Keane of Dearborn, Michigan, who has arranged 140 surrogate births since 1976. Who Keeps "Baby M'?, Newsweek, January 19, 1987, at 45 [hereinafter Who Keeps "Baby M"]. Keane typically
charges $10,000 for arranging the surrogate motherhood relationship. Id. at 47. The
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The parties next negotiate the terms of their relationship. It
may be an informal verbal agreement in which the surrogate agrees
to serve gratuitously.' More often, however, a lawyer drafts a written contract in which the couple agrees to pay for the surrogate's
medical expenses during pregnancy."5 Usually, though not always,
the couple will also agree to pay the surrogate a fee for carrying the
child.' 6 For her part, the surrogate generally agrees to be inseminated, to not abort the child, to seek and accept adequate medical
to terminate her parental rights upon
care, and, most importantly,
7
the birth of the child.1
If the parties are successful in conceiving a child and carrying it
to term, the contracting husband will, upon birth, acknowledge his
legal paternity of the child.'5 The surrogate then relinquishes all of
her parental rights in the child, after which the couple pays her."9
The contracting husband, as legal father, obtains custody of the
contracting couple can expect to spend another $10,000 in hospital and other expenses, including a fee to the surrogate. Id. See also N. KEANE AND D. BREO, THE
SURROGATE MOTHER 269 (1981) (providing a more detailed explanation of the process). For a partial list of the agencies providing surrogate mother services, see Who
Keeps "Baby M"?, at 48; O'Brien, supra note 12, at n.38.
14. See supra note 12. Where the surrogate agrees to perform gratuitously, the
contracting couple can expect to cut its total expenses to as low as $5,000. N. KEANE
& D. BREO, supra note 13, at 269.
15. See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 10, at 263.
16. Id. The surrogate can usually expect to receive approximately $10,000 for
her services. The couple often puts the money into an escrow account until they obtain custody of the child. Who Keeps Baby "M'? supra note 13, at 47.
17. For a discussion of the enforceability of these obligations, see Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50
TENN. L. REV. 71, 83-94 (1982) (arguing that judicial reluctance to enforce personal
service contracts and unwillingness to infringe the woman's right of privacy would
preclude specific performance of these provisions).
18. In Illinois, for example, the contracting husband may bring an action to
determine that he is the parent of the child. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 2507 (1985). This
parent-child relationship may be established by the consent of the surrogate mother,
her spouse if she is married, and the contracting husband. Id. $ 2506. For a discussion
of how statutes recently enacted to enable couples to engage in artificial insemination
may adversely affect this process, see infra text accompanying notes 52 to 54.
19. The mother relinquishes her rights to the child and surrenders custody and
control of it to the state. For an example of the types of forms she must fill out and
the conditions to which she must agree, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1512 (1985). The
woman's surrender becomes irrevocable, but many states allow a waiting period immediately after birth to enable the mother to change her mind. In Illinois, for example, a woman cannot consent to relinquish her rights to her child until seventy-two
hours after birth. Id. 1511. This creates a legal obstacle to enforcing the promise the
surrogate makes some nine months earlier to relinquish her rights over the child at
birth. A more important obstacle, however, are laws that prohibit the receipt of compensation for the "placing out" of children for adoption. See, e.g., id. 1701-05.
These laws arguably make it illegal for surrogate mothers to receive payment for their
services. For an argument that payments are allowed between close family members,
see infra text accompanying notes 205 to 209. For an argument that the laws are
inapplicable to surrogate motherhood, see infra note 120.
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child, 0 and the wife, as stepmother, may initiate an adoption action
to be declared the child's legal mother."1
B.

TraditionalLegal Impediments to Surrogate Motherhood

Married couples have used various versions of the surrogate
motherhood process outlined above throughout history to bear children they otherwise could not have. The Bible documents how the
eighty-seven year-old Abraham and his seventy-seven year-old wife
Sarah engaged in a surrogate mother relationship with Sarah's maid,
Hagar, to produce a son, Ishmael.22 Other commentators have documented the use of the practice throughout the Roman period and

the Middle Ages."3
Legal impediments, however, have traditionally precluded surrogate motherhood as an option for most American families. Longstanding proscriptions against fornication 2 ' and adultery2" made it
illegal for a couple to conceive a child with a surrogate mother. Furthermore, anti-baby-selling statutes criminalizing payments to a biological parent in connection with the adoption of a child prevented
the commercialization of the surrogacy agreement.2" As a result of
these laws, any surrogate motherhood agreement was itself unenforceable under the well-accepted doctrine that any contract requir20. Technically, the contracting husband must petition the state for custody of
the child. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40
2101-26 (1985). The court however, usually approves uncontested custody actions between parties. For example, one commentator has observed that the average amount of time Connecticut courts spend on
uncontested custody hearings is only four minutes. Developments, The Unauthorized
Practiceof Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 1094, 1127
(1976).
21. Where the contracting wife is not related to the child, as is the case in surrogate children born through artificial insemination, she has no parental rights as the
wife of the contracting husband and must establish these rights through the adoption
procedure. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 2504 (1985).
22. GENESIS 16:1-15. One modern-day surrogate has argued that surrogate
motherhood was practiced in the New Testament of the Bible as well, noting that
Mary, the mother of Jesus, was a surrogate for God. Who Keeps Baby "M'?, supra
note 13, at 46. For an account of Mary's pregnancy, see LUKE 1:25-80, 2:1-16. For a
view that the Old Testament instructs that dormant in every surrogate motherhood
arrangement is an explosive and tragic drama, see O'Brien, supra note 12, at 134.
23. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 134.
24. For example, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 11-8a (1985), provides that "any person who cohabits or has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication if the behavior is open and notorious." Id.
25. For example, ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 38, 22-7 (1985) provides:
(A) Any person who cohabits or has sexual intercourse with another not his
spouse commits adultery, if the behavior is open and notorious and (1) the
person is married and the other person involved in such intercourse is not his
spouse; or (2) the person is not married and knows that the other person involved in such intercourse is married.
26.

See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,

1701-05 (1985).
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ing the doing 2of
an act that is illegal or otherwise opposed to public
7
policy is void.
C.

The Rebirth of Surrogate Motherhood

Despite legal impediments, the use of surrogate motherhood is
currently on the rise in the United States.2 8 The factors that have
contributed to this increase include: a rising demand among couples
of childbearing age for alternative means of having a family;2" a
growing inability of adoption services to meet this growing demand;30 and new technological developments enabling a couple to
avoid some of the legal impediments that previously restricted surrogate motherhood. 3'
The rising demand for alternative means of procreation is due,
in part, to the growing number of couples who are encountering
physical barriers to having children through intercourse.2 This is
often due to the wife's age or physical condition. In other cases,
pregnancy poses an unusual health risk to the wife.' Still other
couples fear transmitting genetically linked defects or disease to
their children. 3
Added to this list is the growing number of couples who are
physically capable of having children. Although they wish to become
parents they are unwilling to subject the wife to the physical constraints of a pregnancy. 6 Thus, the wife may have a career that the
27.

See 14

WILLISTON

TRACTS §§ 1373-78, 1510-15
TRACTS § 178 (1986).

CONTRACTS §§ 1628-32 (b) (3d ed. 1972); 6A CORBIN, CON-

(1961 & Supp. 1980);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CON-

28. For example, Noel Keane reports that the number of surrogate births he has
arranged have grown from five between 1976 and 1981 to 65 in 1986 alone. A Chance
to Clear the Foggy Issue of Surrogate Parents,Chicago Tribune, January 18, 1987, §
4 (Perspective) at 1. In all, a total of approximately 500 children have been born in
this country via surrogate motherhood. Id.
29. For a discussion of the factors that have given rise to this increased demand
for alternative means of having a family among couples of childbearing age, see infra
text accompanying notes 32 to 37.
30. For a brief exposition of the wide disparity between the supply of adoptable
children and the demand therefore, see infra text accompanying notes 38 to 40.
31. For a discussion of these technological developments, see infra text accompanying notes 44 to 61.
32. Currently, between 15-20% of couples of childbearing age are incapable of
having children. Handel and Sherwyn, Surrogate Parenting, TRIAL, April, 1982, at
57-58.
33. Id.
34. For example, a woman may be unable to carry the child to term because she
suffers from diabetes. Note, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J.S. & MED.
323, 324 (1981). Elizabeth Stern, the contracting mother in the highly publicized New
Jersey case of Baby M, chose surrogate motherhood because she suffers from a mild
form of multiple sclerosis and worried that pregnancy would aggravate the disease
and leave her paralyzed. Who Keeps Baby 'M? supra note 13, at 47.
35. P. REILLY, GENETICS LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 190 (1977).
36. As one commentator succinctly explained, these include morning sickness, a
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couple does not want to interrupt, or she may simply
not want to
37
endure the physical problems the pregnancy imposes.
While the demand for alternative means of procreation is on the
rise, the traditional means for fulfilling that demand-adoption
placement-has not kept pace. For example, in 1984, more than two
38
million couples contended for 56,000 babies placed in adoption.
Due to this disparity, most couples have to wait several years before
adopting a child.3 9 Many couples are unwilling to endure that wait;
others want a biological link to their child.40
The impediments inherent in adoption have caused many
couples to consider alternatives in order to fulfill their desire to have
a family. Recent scientific advances in the fertilization of genetic
materials have removed some of these traditional legal impediments
to surrogate motherhood, making it become a more attractive alternative."' Specifically, a contracting couple may now conceive a child
with a surrogate mother in either of two methods that arguably do
not violate proscriptions against adultery or fornication: artificial in3
semination42 or in vitro fertilization.4
bulky torso, and the discomfort of childbirth. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 132.
37. The scope of this comment is limited to married couples who engage in surrogate motherhood. The surrogate motherhood process, however, opens up the opportunity of parenthood to those outside the marriage relationship. A single person thus
may want a surrogate to have his child. See, e.g., Wadlington, Artificial Conception:
The Challenge For Family Law 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 493-94 (1983). So too, a homosexual couple may use surrogate motherhood to have a child. See, e.g., Hanscombe, The
Right to Lesbian Parenthood, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 133 (1983). The legal, ethical and
moral issues these possibilities present are beyond the scope of this discussion.
38. Wilson, Adoption: It's Not Impossible, Bus. WK., July 8, 1985 at 112.
39. Comment, Surrogate Motherhood in California:Legislative Proposals, 18
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341 (1981). Some commentators have wrongly attributed this
shortage to increased use of contraceptives and abortions. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra
note 12; Coleman, supra note 7, at 72 n.5; Turano, Black Market Adoptions 22 CATH.
LAw. 48 (1976). During the period in which contraceptives and abortions became
more available, illegitimate births did not decrease but increased. Landes and Posner,
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 325 (1978). In light of
this increase, the decreased availability of children for adoption is better explained by
social factors, such as the diminished social and legal stigma accompanying illegitimacy; recognition of constitutional limits on legal discrimination predicated on illegitimate status; greater economic opportunity and child care services for single
women; and changing male attitudes about child raising. See Wadlington, supra note
37, at 466-67.
40. See N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 13, at 15 (discussing the importance of
the biological link).
41. For a discussion of how these advances enable modern surrogate motherhood to proceed without violating laws against adultery or fornication, see infra text
accompanying notes 44 to 61.
42. For a discussion of artificial insemination, see infra text accompanying
notes 44 to 55.
43. For a discussion of in vitro fertilization, see infra text accompanying notes
56 to 61.
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D. Removing the Legal Impediments: Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination involves the introduction of semen into
the vagina of the surrogate through means other than intercourse."
Usually a doctor injects the semen into the surrogate through a syringe." The process was originally developed to enable married
couples, incapable of becoming pregnant because of male sterility, to
have a child. 4 The doctor inseminates the wife with sperm that a
fertile third party donor provides. 47 Several courts in the later 1950's
and early 1960's held that this procedure, dubbed "AID" (artificial
insemination donor), was adulterous48 and that the children born
from it were illegimate. 49 More recent decisions, however, have reversed that trend. 0 Modern courts have properly recognized adul44.
45.
46.
his wife

Guttmacher, Artificial Insemination, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 566 (1969).
Id.
The husband may be capable of copulation but incapable of impregnating
due to azoopermia, which is an absence of sperm cells in his semen. W. FINE-

GOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

20 (1964); or he may be capable of impregnation, but

fears transmitting a genetic defect. Guttmacher, supra note 44, at 570.
47. "Donor" is actually a euphemism, as 90% of the so-called donors are actually paid $20-$35 per ejaculation by a sperm bank which serves as a third party intermediary between the donor and the couple employing artificial insemination. Annas,
Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor 14 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6
(1980).
AID should be distinguished from two other forms of artifical insemination, artificial insemination, homologous (AIH) and artificial insemination, confused (AIC).
AIH employs the husband's semen to impregnate, and is used where normal copulation is impossible because of physical disorders such as penile deformity or vaginal
scarring. AIC mixes the donor's sperm with that of the husband. Its main advantage
is to alleviate the feelings of inadequacy that the husband may develop when only the
donor's sperm is used. Dienes, Artificial Donor Insemination: Perspectives on Legal
and Social Change, 54 IowA L. REV. 253, 267-69 (1968).
48. Orford v. Orford 58 D.L.R. 251, 255 (Ont. 1921) (wife's submission to AID
without husband's consent is adulterous); See also Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23
U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook County I1. 1954), appeal dismissed, 12 Ill. App. 2d
473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (wife's submission to AID with or without husband's consent is adultery).
49. Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook County Ill. 1954),
appeal dismissed, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (child born with or
without husband's consent via AID is illegitimate); See also Gursky v. Gursky, 39
Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (retains common law notion that
a child begotten by a man who was not mother's husband was illegitimate).
50. For cases holding that the child born of AID is not illegitimate, see In re
Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (child born
of consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child and is entitled to the
rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of same marriage); See also In re
Adoption of McFayden, 108 Ill.App. 3d 319, 438 N.E.2d 1362 (1982), cert denied, 460
U.S. 1015 (1983) (where wife is impregnated by AID, husband is entitled to presumption of paternity, which may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence); Happel
v. Mecklenburger, 101 Ill.App. 3d 107, 427 N.E.2d 974, 979, n.1 (1981) (strongly criticizes early decisions).
For cases holding that the husband of a woman inseminated by AID has support
obligations toward the child born from that process, see Anonymous v. Anonymous,
41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S. 2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Strand v. Strand, 190 Misc. 786,
78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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tery to be a prohibition against illicit sexual intercourse, and have
correctly found no such activity to be part of the artificial insemination process.51 Applying the same reasoning, surrogate motherhood,
which is AID with a third party, should not run afoul of adultery or
fornication law.
In following the lead of the courts, many states have passed
laws which, while promoting the use of AID, have also created new
legal hurdles for surrogate motherhood. 2 These laws typically provide that a child born from AID is legitimate, that the mother who
gives birth to the child and her husband are the child's natural parents, and, most importantly in the context of surrogate motherhood,
that the sperm donor has no parental rights in the child.53 These
For a case holding that the husband has visitation rights in the case of a separation or divorce, see People v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1958) (best
interests of child and equity entitle former husband to visitation rights).
For authority holding that AID is not adultery, see Annotation, Artifical Insemination, 25 A.L.R. 3d 1103, 1107 54 (1969); Note, The Legal Status of Artificial Insemination: A Need for Policy Formulation, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 409, 418 (1970).
51. This is well expressed in Maclennan v. Maclennan, 1958 Sess. Cas. 105
(Scot. Outer House) (AID even without husband's consent is not adultery because it
does not involve the physical conduct proscribed in adultery; adultery is concerned
with means, AID is concerned with ends-impregnation). Id. at 114. See also CLARK,
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATION IN THE UNITED STATES 329 (1968) (AID not considered
adultery because it does not involve physical contact, sexual gratification, or marital
infidelity).
52. Legislatures in at least 26 states have addressed the legitimacy issue of AID
children with statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 25. 20.045 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141
(1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-6-106 (1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT.ANN. §§ 45-69f, 69n (West 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West
1979); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 74 § 101.1 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 1 1451-53 (1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-128-30 (1974); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1987);
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(B) (1974); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111
(1980); MINN. STAT. ANN § 257.56 (West. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985);
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 126.061 (1979); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 494-1 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 551-52 (West. Supp. 1980); OR.
REV. STAT. 109, 239, 109.247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.579 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. §68-3-306 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2.-7.1 1980); WASH. REV. CODE 26.26050 (1986); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-103
(1978).
53. For example, Illinois law provides that children born of AID are to be
treated as naturally conceived legitimate children:
Any child or children born as the result of heterologous artificial insemination
shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived
legitimate child of the husband and wife so requesting to the use of such
technique.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 1 1452 (1985).
Moreover, the husband or wife is to be treated as the natural parent.
(A) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
the husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man
not her husband, the husband shall be treated in the law as if he were the
natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in
writing executed and acknowledged by both the husband and the wife. The
physician who is to perform the technique shall certify that signatures and the
date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent in the medical record
where it shall be kept confidential and held by the patient's physician. How-
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laws are intended to provide parents of AID children protection
from custody battles with anonymous sperm donors and to relieve
both parent and child of the legal disabilities imposed through
illegitimacy.
While beneficial to couples suffering from male infertility, these
laws have created a new impediment to surrogate motherhood.
When applied in the surrogate motherhood context, they arguably
serve to prevent the contracting husband from establishing his legal
paternity.54 As a result, they require the contracting husband, who is
the biological father, to adopt his own child in order to obtain custody. This incongruous result runs counter to all public policy goals
concerning the promotion of families. If surrogate motherhood is to
be viable, the courts and legislatures must distinguish between
anonymous sperm donors in the AID context and the contracting
husbands in the surrogate motherhood context. Accordingly, the
courts should hold the aforementioned laws, passed to protect the
parties in AID, inapplicable in the context of surrogate motherhood.
Artificial insemination also increases the number of married
couples who can employ surrogate motherhood to have a family.
Previously, only married couples that included a fertile male could
procreate through surrogate motherhood. Artificial insemination
provides couples with non-fertile males access to the surrogate
motherhood process as well. In these cases, the contracting couple
inseminates the surrogate mother with semen obtained from a thirdparty donor, often through a sperm bank."5 This version of the surrogate motherhood process is particularly desirable where both the
contracting husband and his wife suffer from infertility or run a
high risk of passing on a genetically-related disease. The only difference between this type of surrogate motherhood and that previously
discussed is that in this case neither contracting parent is biologically linked to the child. As a result, the couple must go through
adoption procedures to obtain custody.
ever, the physician's failure to do so shall not affect the legal relationship between father and child. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination,
whether part of the permanent medical record held by the physician or not, are
subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(B) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife shall be treated in law as
if he were not the natural father of the child thereby conceived.
Id. T 1453(a).
54. No court has yet applied these statutes to the surrogate motherhood
context.
55. For an explanation of the likely legal relationships that this type of surrogate motherhood creates, see Wadlington supra note 37, at 494.
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E. In Vitro Fertilization
Like artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization allows the parties to avoid some of the legal impediments traditionally imposed
upon the surrogate motherhood process. In principle, it involves the
surgical extraction of an ovum from a woman's body, subsequent
fertilization of the ovum in a laboratory, and implantation of the
fertilized ovum into the surrogate's body. 6 If all is successful, the
surrogate gives birth to a child nine months later. Like artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization involves no sexual intercourse between the surrogate and any other party. Thus, while no court has
yet decided a case challenging the legality of in vitro fertilization,
the reasoning employed in the modern artificial insemination cases
would likely apply, holding that the process does not violate adultery and fornication laws. 7
In contrast to artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization offers
the contracting wife an opportunity to have a biological link with
her child. Moreover, she may do so without suffering the physical
problems and changes in lifestyle associated with pregnancy."8 This
is particularly advantageous where the wife is fertile, but is either
unwilling or incapable of carrying a child to term. 9 Thus, the couple
may surgically remove an ovum from the contracting mother, fertilize it in vitro with her husband's sperm, or, if he is infertile, with
sperm from a third-party donor, and implant it into the body of the
surrogate for the nine-month gestation period. No court or legislature has yet grappled with the thorny issue of whether the ovum
donor or the surrogate is the mother of the child."0 To deny the contracting wife's claim of maternity as ovum donor, however, while
recognizing the contracting husband's claim of paternity as sperm
donor, would likely violate the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of
equal protection under the law."1 Thus, in addition to providing the
contracting wife with a biological link to her child, in vitro fertiliza56. The doctor extracts the ovum from the woman's body through laproscopy,
and then places the egg in a petri dish already containing the donor sperm. Kolata,
How In Vitro Fertilizationis Done, 201 SCIENCE 698 (1978). If fertilization occurs,
the fertilized egg is ready in 2-4 days for replacement into the body. Id. For pictures
of the first baby born in America through this method, see Fadiman, Small Miracles
of Love and Science, LIFE, November, 1982 at 44.
57. For a discussion of the reasoning the courts employ to hold that artificial
insemination does not violate adultery and fornication laws, see supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
58. For a brief explanation of these lifestyle problems, see supra text at note
36-37.
59. This includes, for example, women who have a history of miscarriages.
60. For a discussion of the legal possibilities, see Wadlington, supra note 37, at
495-96.
61. "No state shall. . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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tion also offers her an opportunity to establish her legal maternity.
F. Removing the Remaining Legal Impediments to Surrogate
Motherhood
The advent of new genetic technologies, and the removal of
many legal impediments made possible as a result, have encouraged
proponents of surrogate motherhood to argue that the state should
heed the growing demand for alternative methods of procreation
and legitimize surrogate motherhood relationships.6 2 Opponents of
surrogate motherhood contend, however, that these new technologies have failed to alter the major remaining legal impediments to
surrogate motherhood: laws preventing the offer or receipt of payment in consideration for a mother's relinquishment of her parental
rights.6" The opponents argue that the surrogate receives a fee, in
part, to compensate her for her relinquishment of her rights over the
child in violation of these laws. 4 Viewed in this context, commercial
surrogate motherhood is tantamount to baby selling, and as such the
state is proper in prohibiting it. 5
Proponents reply that the right to engage in surrogate motherhood is a fundamental right protected by the constitutional right of
privacy,"s and that complete prohibitions on commercial surrogacy
infringe this right and are unnecessary to achieve a compelling state
interest.6" It is to a consideration of that constitutional argument
and its ramifications that this comment now turns.

II. SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
A. Constitutional Protection for Non-Textual Rights: Substantive
Due Process Analysis
The Constitution makes no specific mention of the right of married couples to employ surrogate motherhood as a means of becom62. See, e.g., Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L.
Rrv. 373, 395 (1980). ("Surrogate motherhood, subject to reasonable regulation, deserves a place among the growing panoply of methods available to individuals for the
ordering of their marital and reproductive lives.")
63. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 12, at 143.
64. Id.
65. Id. For a view that the state ought to legalize baby selling, see generally
Landes and Posner, supra note 39.
66. The Supreme Court has broadly defined the right of privacy as an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and an interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429

U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
67. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 17, at 75-82 (surrogate motherhood protected
by constitutional right of privacy). But see O'Brien, supra note 12, at 139-42 (arguing
that surrogate motherhood not protected by right of privacy).
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ing parents. The United States Supreme Court, however, has long
held that the concept of liberty embodied in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment"8 is broad enough to extend constitutional protection to certain rights not explicitly mentioned in the
text of the document.69 Under this substantive due process analysis,
the Court determines whether a particular substantive right is included in the concept of liberty, and is thereby protected from unwarranted state infringement."0
Between 1897 to 1937, the Court regularly invoked substantive
due process analysis to invalidate state laws seeking to regulate social and economic matters.7' After the court-packing crisis of the
1930s,7" however, the Court announced that it would defer to a state
legislature's judgment in these matters, so long as the law in ques68. "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty and property without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending constitutional protection to a woman's decision to have an abortion as protected aspect of the right to
privacy).
70. For an overview discussion of substantive due process analysis, see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 421-55, 886-990 (1977); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331-416 (3d ed. 1986).
71. This is often referred to as the "Lochner era" after one of the more famous
cases of the period, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state statute limiting
bakers to 60-hour work week unnecessarily infringed bakers' liberty of contract,
which is one of the liberties protected from undue infringement by the 14th amendment). The so-called Lochner era actually began at least eight years before Lochner
was handed down with the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (state
statute preventing any contracts with a company not licensed to perform marine business held to exceed the state's inherent police power by infringing liberty of contract
and thereby violating the 14th amendment).
During the Lochner era, the Court invalidated statutes either on the basis that
the statute did not further a legitimate goal of the government, as in Allgeyer, or for
the lack of a plausible argument that the legislative means furthered the goal, as in
Lochner. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 527 (11th ed. 1985). In general, the
Court sought to advance the popular belief that the state could only use its police
power to advance the general welfare, and not to help certain parties gain an imporved bargaining position with those with whom they bargained to sell their services. TRIBE, supra note 70, at 427-34. The Court did allow the state to intervene to
improve the bargaining position of certain groups whom it held to suffer from a vulnerable bargaining position. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 166 U.S. 366 (1897) (coal
miners). See also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (women). For a view that the
Court, in making these exceptions, sowed the seeds of destruction for substantive due
process analysis, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
72. After the Lochner Court rejected much of President Roosevelt's New Deal
legislation, he introduced a bill into the Senate in 1937 that would have allowed him
to appoint an additional justice to the Court for every sitting justice over 70 years of
age. Six justices were over 70 in 1937. For an excerpt and a discussion of the proposed
legislation, see G. GUNTHER, supra note 71, at 128-30.
The court-packing crisis is generally considered not to have been the actual cause
of the Court's rejection of substantive due process analysis, but only to have affected
the timing of the Court's change in thinking. For a discussion of the forces that precipitated the fall of the Lochner era, see TRIBE, supra note 70, at 442-55.
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tion was rationally related to a legitimate state interest." While the
Court subsequently indicated that it would still strictly scrutinize
laws that infringed upon the Bill of Rights, the political process, or
insular minorities,7 4 the practice of extending constitutional protection to rights for which the document itself offered no textual support became largely discredited."" Recently, however, the Court has
revived the use of substantive due process analysis to extend constitutional protection to certain rights that are not mentioned in the
text of the document, but which the Court nevertheless determines
to be fundamental. 6 In such cases, the Court strictly scrutinizes the
statute and requires the state to prove that the law is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that end."
The process through which the Supreme Court determines
which non-textual rights are so fundamental as to merit this higher
level of due process scrutiny is decidedly unmechanical and largely
undefined. The Court has articulated, however, two general approaches by which it makes this determination. First, the Court will
declare a non-textual right to be fundamental if it determines it to
be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."8 This is the familiar
analysis Justice Cardozo set forth in Palko v. Connecticut.70 Under
this analysis, even though a right is not explicitly mentioned within
the text of the document, the Court will extend constitutional pro73. This standard was first articulated three years before the fall of the Lochner
era in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (if the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied). In 1936, however, the
Court relied on Lochner era rationale to invalidate New York's minimum wage law
for women. Moorhead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). After
Roosevelt announced his plan, the Court overruled Moorehead one year later, upholding a minimum wage law for women in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
579. (1937) (regulation that is reasonable to its subject and is adopted in the interests
of the community affords due process).
74. This is Justice Stone's famous footnote four to United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (identifying what laws the court may still
subject to strict scrutiny).
75. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal, 335 U.S.
525, 535 (1949) (Lochner era constitutional doctrine unanimously and explicitly repudiated); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (Court emphatically
refused to use the due process clause to strike down state laws regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought).
76. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (extending constitutional protection to a woman's decision whether to bear a child).
77. Id.
78. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
79. Id. Although Palko concerned whether the Due Process clause protected a
textually-based right from undue state infringement -- i.e. the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against double jeopardy -- the "ordered liberty" standard that Palko articulated has since become one criteria by which non-textual liberties are afforded
Constitutional protection. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
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tection to it if the failure to do so would undermine those basic values that the rights stated in the document were intended to preserve.8 0 Determining which non-textual rights are, in this sense,
indispensible to the continued preservation of these constitutional
values is, of necessity, an abstract and speculative process.
To complement this approach, the Court has more recently declared that it will also rank as fundamental those liberties that are
deeply rooted in the nation's history and traditions." Justice Powell
articulated this standard in Moore v. East Cleveland. 2 While some
have argued that the Moore approach, with its emphasis on history,
unduly broadens the scope of substantive due process analysis,82 it is
more proper to view Moore as restating the basic principles set forth
in Palko in a manner that acknowledges traditional Supreme Court
jurisprudence."' The Palko approach requires the Court to project
into the future and determine what impact a denial of constitutional
protection would have on basic constitutional values. The Moore approach requires the Court to reflect on the past and to determine
whether the asserted right has traditionally been part of the basic
values that underlie our society, and which the Constitution has
sought to protect.
Although the methodologies differ, a unified logic emerges when
the approaches are read together. The asserted right must take its
place in relation to the basic traditions and decisions that have come
before, while at the same time serving as an essential foundation for
what is to come, in protecting those values that are the focus of the
Constitution."5
80. The appropriate source of these values remains a subject of ongoing debate.
For a view that the Court is limited to those values derived from the text, history,
and structure of the Constitution, see Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing
Mode of JudicialReview, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978). For a view that unwritten higher
principles may also be constitutionally protected, see Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).

81. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1976) (appropriate limits on
substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the teachings of history and solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting).
84. In Palko, Justice Cardozo noted that those principles that are at the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty are those that are so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
85. Justice Harlan discussed substantive due process analysis in these terms in
his oft-cited dissent:
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a
background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived
and historically developed. Though we exercise limited and sharply restricted
judgment, yet there is no "mechanical yardstick," no "mechanical answer."
The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must
take "its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for
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An application of these principles to the right of married
couples to engage in surrogate motherhood reveals that it is a logical
and natural extension of a long line of constitutional case law protecting an individual right to autonomy in decisions relating to procreation and family matters. This comment next examines those
cases and their relation to surrogate motherhood.
B. Surrogate Motherhood, ProcreationalAutonomy, and the
Right to Privacy
In considering which non-textual rights should be afforded a
higher degree of constitutional protection from state action, the
Court has consistently demonstrated a large measure of respect for
those rights related to the basic responsibilities of family life. The
Supreme Court first articulated these principles in the 1923 case of
Meyer v. Nebraska,"'where it struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in public schools to young children.8 7 In giving substantive content to the notion of liberty embodied in the fourteenth amendment, the Court held that liberty
included not only freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right
of the individual to marry, to establish a home, and to bring up children.8" A unanimous Court further explained this right two years
later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters" in striking down a law requiring children to attend public school. 90 The Pierce Court recognized
that the state does not have sole dominion over children born into
it.'" It held, rather, that those who nurture a child and direct his
destiny have rights and duties as well, the exercise of which the due
process clause protects from undue state infringement. 92 This includes the right to prepare the child for the additional obligations
he may encounter. 9
In establishing constitutional protection for the non-textual
rights to marry, to establish a home, to bring up children, and to
prepare them for future obligations, Pierce and Meyer created a
context for the Court's subsequent decisions that clearly establish a
right of autonomy over procreational decisions. The Court first announced this right in 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma,'94 in which it
what is to come."
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 399.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id.

94. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:715

struck down an Oklahoma law providing for the sterilization of certain recidivist felons.95 In invalidating the law on equal protection
grounds,96 the Court justified its application of strict scrutiny on the
basis that procreation is among the basic civil rights of man, and is
fundamental to the very existence of the human race.97 In so doing,
the Court implied that the right of procreation was so essential to
the exercise of other fundamental rights that arbitrary state interference with it would infringe constitutionally-protected values.
Having protected the individual's right to procreate, the Court's
next line of decisions protected the individual's right not to procreate. This obverse right was first articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 9 in which the Court struck down a state law prohibiting married couples from using contraceptives." The Court, in a plurality
opinion, held that the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the Constitution emanate penumbras which create a right
of privacy. 00 This encompasses the right of married couples to decide whether or not to use contraceptives without undue state
interference.
Despite the Court's creative attempt to find textual support for
the right of privacy and thereby avoid applying substantive due process analysis,10' it nevertheless noted that the right to privacy was
older than the Bill of Rights from which it purported to draw support. '10 In doing so, the Griswold Court echoed the reasoning set
95. Id. Fifteen years earlier the Court had held that a law requiring the sterilization of so-called "imbeciles" did not violate due process or equal protection. Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Skinner did not explicity overrule Buck. For a view that
the Court would overturn Buck if it were presented with it today, see Burgdoff and
Burgdoff, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of
Handicapped Persons, 50 TEmp. L.Q. 995, 1011, 1023 (1977).
96. Skinner came before the Court just five years after it had repudiated substantive due process analysis. See supra note 73.
97. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
98. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
99. Id.
100, Id. at 482-85. One of the Court's first implied references to a right of privacy was in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). There the
court noted: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. As well said by Judge Cooly: "The right to one's person
may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone." Justice Brandies
subsequently described it as "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
101. Justice Douglas noted: "Coming to the merits, we are met with a wide
range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. State of New
York... should be our guide. But we decline that invitiation.
Griswold, 301 U.S.
at 481-82. (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 486.
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forth in Skinner0 8 and implicit in the substantive due process anal05
ysis applied in Meyer'04 and Pierce.1
In sum, the right to exercise
autonomy over conception is one of a group of core rights basic to
society and is therefore a value which the Constitution seeks to
protect.
The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, 6 recognized that the
right of privacy was broad enough to protect an individual's decision, not only whether to conceive a child, but whether to give birth
to a child already conceived. 0 7 In protecting this right, the Court
declined to find implicit textual support for it as the Griswold penumbra analysis had purported to do.'08 Notably, the Court held
that the liberty interest articulated by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protected the right of privacy.0 9 In so doing,
the Court resurrected substantive due process analysis as the appropriate means for extending constitutional protection to procreational
matters. " ' The Court thereby reconciled its decisions in Griswold,
Roe, and their progeny with those in Meyer, Pierce, and, by implication, Skinner. These cases thus stand for the right of the individual
to be protected under the right of privacy from unwarranted governmental intrusion into decisions related to childbearing."' The rationale justifying this protection is that childbearing decisions are
essential to all other rights and values that the Constitution seeks to
protect.
For many infertile couples, surrogate motherhood is their only
103. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97. (procreation among basic civil
rights of man and fundamental to existence of human race).
104. See supra next accompanying notes 86-88 (liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment includes right of individual to marry, establish a home, and bring
up children).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93 (due process clause protects
rights of those who nurture a child and direct his destiny).
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 153.
109. Id.
110. Even Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, did not object to the application of
due process analysis. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He opposed, however,
what he termed the "transplanting" of the compelling state interest test from equal
protection analysis to due process analysis. Id. He argued that the traditional rational
relation test should be applied instead. Id.
111. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). Justice Brennan later
clarified this point:
The constitutional protection of individual autonomy in matters of childbearing is not dependent on [intrusion into marital bedrooms]. These decisions put
Griswold in its proper perspective. Griswold may no longer be read as holding
only that a state may not prohibit a married couple's use of contraceptives.
Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution
protects individual decisions in matters of child bearing from unjustified instructions by the state.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
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means of bearing children. It is proper, therefore, to rank their decision to employ surrogate motherhood as a protected aspect of the
right of privacy. For these couples, having the ability to decide how
to have children is inextricably tied to their exercise of their constitutionally protected right to decide whether to conceive" 3 and
bear" children, whether to procreate at all,' 4 and if so how to
rear" their children. As such, the decision to engage in surrogate
motherhood embodies other rights, which the Court has acknowledged predate the Bill of Rights', and which lie at the center of
constitutionally protected values.1 7 When a couple decides to engage in surrogate motherhood, it therefore exercises a right that is
deeply rooted in our history and tradition, and in an indispensible
aspect of an ordered liberty. It is thus appropriate to extend constitutional protection to the decision to engage in surrogate motherhood as an aspect of the constitutional right of privacy.
Recent state supreme court decisions support this view. The supreme courts of Oklahoma"" and Florida," 9 while not having considered a constitutional right to surrogate motherhood per se, have
nevertheless recognized a related right in the fundamental right to
adopt. While the United States Supreme Court has never constitutionally recognized the right to adopt, the logic of these decisions
suggests that if the right to adopt is fundamental, so too is the right
to engage in surrogate motherhood for the purpose of bearing a child
for adoption. 2 0
112. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105 (tracing development of constitutional protection for decision whether to conceive child).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11 (tracing development of constitutional protection for decision whether to have child already conceived).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97 (tracing constitutional protection
for the basic responsibilities of family life).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
116. See supra text accompanying note 102.
117. Carey, 431 U.S. at 678 (decision whether to beget a child is at the very

heart of the cluster of constitutionally protected choices); see also Zablocki v.
Redhall, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidates state law prohibiting the marriage of persons who have unpaid child support obligations on the grounds that the decision to
marry is protected by the right of privacy and is placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbearing, child rearing, and family
relations).
118. In re Del Moral Rodriguez, 552 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1976) (Court finds no distinction between fundamental right to procreate and the right to adopt children).
119. Grissom v. Dade County, 293 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1974) (fundamental right to
have children either through procreation or adoption so basic as to be inseparable
from the rights to enjoy and defend life and liberty to pursue happiness).
120. One state supreme court has upheld the right of an agency to arrange surrogate motherhood contracts, but not on constitutional grounds. The Kentucky Supreme Court in Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.
209 (Ky. 1986), held that the agency did not violate a state statute prohibiting the
purchasing of children for purposes of adoption. Id. at 212-13. The court held that it
was the role of the legislature to delineate public policy on scientific advancements,
and absent a legislative pronouncement that surrogate motherhood was impermissi-
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Fundamental rights, however, are not absolute. They may be infringed by a statute that is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
state interest. 1 This comment next discusses whether prohibitions
on payments to surrogates infringe this right.
C. ProhibitingPayments to Surrogates: Infringing the Right to
Privacy
While the Constitution protects the decisions to engage in surrogate motherhood as a fundamental right, a prohibition against the
payment or receipt of consideration in conjunction with the relinquishment of parental rights may infringe this right. Some argue it
does not.' While such a law may make it more difficult for a couple
to effect their decision to engage in surrogate motherhood, it arguably does not prevent the couple from making the decision to do so,
nor from realizing it altogether. The couple may still engage in surrogate motherhood with a surrogate who will perform gratuitously.
The Supreme Court cases that arguably support this argument
are those that hold that the government may choose not to fund
abortions for financially needy pregnant women in structuring welfare programs.2 s The rationale of these cases is that while government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of a
decision protected under the right of privacy, it need not undertake
affirmative steps to remove obstacles not of its own creation. 24
Thus, in the case of a poor pregnant woman, it is her indigency, not
state action, that prevents her from obtaining an abortion.' 25 Likewise, in surrogate motherhood, it is the couple's infertility, not any
act by the state, that prevents them from having a child.
The flaw in this reasoning is that the plight of the indigent
pregnant woman is not analogous to that of the couple seeking to
procreate through surrogate motherhood. The barriers that the indigent pregnant woman faces are the abortion price levels that the
marketplace imposes in order to achieve an efficient allocation of
ble, the doctrine of separation of powers prevented the court from ruling it illegal.

But see Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) (court rejects
argument that state law prohibiting exchange of money in connection with adoption
services impermissible infringed would-be parents' rights in deciding how to beget or
bear a child). Cf. Skyrowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985)
(without overruling Doe, court allowed plaintiff to use state paternity act, designed to
enforce child support obligations, to establish his paternity over child born by AID by
married surrogate).
121. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
122. See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
123. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471-74
(1977).
124. Harris,448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
125. Id.
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abortion services. 2 ' To the extent that this marketplace operates independently, reacting to forces that are largely beyond the control of
the government, the woman cannot blame her inability to effectuate
her decision to abort on any state action. The couple seeking to engage in surrogate motherhood, however, faces exactly the opposite
problem. Unlike the indigent pregnant woman, an infertile couple
can often meet the price level that the marketplace imposes to
achieve an efficient allocation of surrogate motherhood services. The
barrier such a couple faces is, thus, not forces beyond the control of
government, but the government's own prohibition on payment.
While there are recorded cases of women who have served gratuitously as surrogates,1 7 the prohibition against payment so reduces
the potential number of surrogates as to effectively deny most
couples the opportunity to procreate in this manner.12 8 In denying
the couples' access to the surrogate motherhood process, the state
thus infringes their fundamental right.
A line of post-Roe Supreme Court cases support this view, holding that statutes which substantially limit access to the means of
effectuating a decision that is protected under the right of privacy
are subject to the same scrutiny as statutes that prohibit the decision entirely. 12 9 The Supreme Court has applied this principle in
striking down laws that burden a woman's decision to seek an abortion by requiring her to obtain spousal 3 ° or parental consent;'

3

1

or

3

by requiring her doctor to protect potentially viable fetuses,
to
perform the abortion in a hospital,' 3 3 or to provide the patient with
anti-abortion information.' In light of these rulings, the Court
126. Id.
127. See supra text accompanying note 14 (describing couples of women who
serve gratuitously as surrogate mothers).
128. Black, supra note 62, at 389 (arguing that since the services of a surrogate
mother are far too onerous to be provided gratuitously, a ban on payments to surrogate mothers effectively bans surrogate motherhood itself and therefore violates the
couple's constitutional right of privacy).
129. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-90.
130. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Court strikes
down state provision barring married woman in most circumstances from obtaining
abortion during first 12 weeks of pregnancy without her husband's written consent).
131. Id. (struck down provision requiring an unmarried woman under 18 to obtain consent of parent or guardian, before obtaining abortion. See also Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (struck down law requiring unmarried minor to obtain
consent of both parents before abortion). Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)
(upholds state law requiring doctor to notify, if possible, parents or guardian of minor
upon whom an abortion was to be performed).
132. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (state law subjecting doctors to
criminal liability if they failed to follow statutory standard-of-care when fetus was
viable struct down).
133. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(strikes down state law requiring, inter alia, that second trimester abortions be performed only in hospital).
134. Id. (strikes down state regulation requiring doctor to inform patient of sta-
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would undoubtedly find that a law that prevented a woman from
paying a doctor to perform an abortion would unduly burden her
decision whether to have a child. While there might be a few doctors
still willing to perform abortions gratuitously under such a law, it
would undoubtedly have the inevitable effect of substantially limiting a woman's access to the means of effectuating her decision to
have an abortion. Such a law would, therefore, infringe a woman's
right of privacy. Laws that prevent payments to surrogates also burden a married couple's decision whether to procreate by surrogate
motherhood. While some women may still perform gratuitously as
surrogates, such laws have the effect of dramatically limiting the
couples' access to surrogate motherhood. For many couples, surrogate motherhood is their only means of effectuating their decision to
engage in childbearing. Such laws, therefore, infringe these couples'
fundamental rights.
D. In Search of a Compelling State Interest
Because a law that regulates payment to surrogate mothers infringes a couple's fundamental right to procreate in this manner, the
state must demonstrate that the law is necessary and is narrowly
drawn to achieve a compelling state interest in order to establish its
constitutionality. 15 The following subsections analyze several possible interests that the state may assert in its efforts to justify infringing upon the couple's fundamental procreational rights. These interests include: promoting public morals; 30 protecting the institution
of the family; 7 preventing injury to the parties of the relationship; s and providing for the best interests of any child born from
the relationship. 3 9 Of these, only the last two are sufficiently compelling to justify regulating the surrogate motherhood relationship.
1. Morality-Based Interests
Surrogate motherhood involves procreation outside the traditional bounds of the marriage relationships, and as such arguably
runs counter to traditional moral precepts. The state, however, can
enact laws under its inherent police power to regulate public
morals. 40 Thus, the state may arguably regulate surrogate mothertus of pregnancy, development of fetus, date of possible viability, physical and emotional complications that may result from abortion, services of support agencies).
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
136. See infra text accompanying notes 140 to 155.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 156 to 174.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 175 to 180.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 181 to 186.
140. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (state's police
power includes the power to promote the "health, safety, morals, or general welfare"
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hood as a means of promoting the morals of the community.
The Court has traditionally held, however, that the state's interest in promoting public morals is insufficient to justify the infringement of a fundamental right. 4' Two first amendment cases illustrate this point. The Court upheld the state's regulation of
obscene materials in a movie theater in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton,'4 1 as a means of protecting the state's interest in order and
morality. 48 By contrast, the Court overturned the state's regulation
of obscene materials in the privacy of a home in Stanley v. Georgia, 44 even though the law purported to promote similar interests as
in Paris.'45 These conflicting results may be explained as follows.
Because obscene materials are, by definition, beyond the protection
of the first amendment,' 41 the state's exercise of its police power
in Paris in regulating such materials infringed no fundamental
rights. 147 Its interest in promoting the public morals thus outweighed any individual interest in viewing obscenity, and was, therefore, justified. 48 In Stanley v. Georgia,14 s however, the state's efforts
to promote public morals required an intrusion into a private citizen's home, infringing the defendant's fundamental right of privacy. 5 0 The state's interest in promoting public morals was, thus,
insufficient to outweigh the individual's interest in exercising his
fundamental right.' 5'
This conclusion is supported by recent decisions in procreationrelated cases. For example, in Carey v. Population Services. 52 the
Supreme Court held that the state's interest in preventing teenagers
from engaging in immoral sex acts was insufficient to outweigh their
fundamental right to decide whether to have a child. Thus, the
Court struck down a law restricting the distribution of contraceptives to pharmacists. 15 The Court offered similar reasoning in Eiof citizens)

141. But cf. TRIBE, supra note 70, at 928 (all normative judgments are rooted in
moral premises).
142. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
143. Id. at 61 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
144. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
145. Id. at 565-66.
146. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding "that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press")
147. Paris,413 U.S. at 69 (holding that commerce in obscene material is unprotected by any constitutional doctrine of privacy, and that "[s]tates have a legitimate
interest... in regulating [the] exhibition of obscene material in places of public
accommodation").
148. Id. at 69.

149. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
150. The Court found that the invasion of privacy violated the defendant's first
and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 565.

151. Id. at 568.
152.

431 U.S. 678 (1977).

153. Id. at 699.
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senstadt v. Baird,1 5 4 in which it implied that the only state interest
that would be sufficient to outweigh the individual's interest in exercising autonomy in procreational decisions would be the state's interest in preventing health hazards. 55 Implicitly, the state's interest
in promoting morals would be insufficient to outweigh the individual's interest in exercising a fundamental right. Applying this principle to surrogate motherhood, a law prohibiting payments to the surrogate mother is unconstitutional insofar as its purpose is to protect
or promote public morals. This is because the state's interest in promoting morals is insufficient to justify infringing upon the contracting couple's interest in exercising its fundamental right of
procreational autonomy.
2.

Preserving the Institution of the Family

Surrogate motherhood, in bringing a third party into the procreation process, runs counter to society's traditional notion of the
nuclear family. The state has an interest in preserving the institution of the family for two reasons. First, the family is the primary
institution through which children become self-reliant participants
in the political process. 1 "' Second, the family also provides children
with the emotional and economic support they need to grow and
engage in social discourse.5 7 Thus, the state may, arguably, regulate
surrogate motherhood as a means of preserving this valuable
institution.
While surrogate motherhood may introduce variances to the nuclear family, the relationships it creates are not dissimilar, but actually similar to, those that the Court has traditionally protected from
regulation. Notably, the Court has never restricted its concept of the
family merely to that of the nuclear family."' On the contrary, the
Court has stated that our tradition as a society and the accumulated
wisdom of civilization as a whole support a larger conception of family. 159 While the Court has never delineated the limits to which it is
prepared to extend the concept of family, an examination of the
other types of relationships the Court has so far protected under it,
and the common characteristics they share, indicate that surrogate
154. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
155. Id. at 464 (White, J., concurring) ("to sanction a medical restriction upon
distribution of a contraceptive not proved hazardous. . .would impair the exercise of
the constitutional right.").
156. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979).
157. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform ("OFFER"), 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1976).
158. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1975).
159. Id. at 504, 508 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the Constitution cannot be interpreted to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living").
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motherhood falls within its ambit.
The Court extended constitutional protection to relationships
outside the nuclear family in Stanley v. Illinois.' In Stanley, the
Court invalidated a state law that deprived an unwed father of a
hearing before his illegitimate child was put up for adoption.' The
Court reasoned that an unwed father, no less than an unwed
mother, has a right to the custody and companionship of a child he
had sired and raised.' 62 Significantly, even in a context outside that
of the nuclear family, the Court acknowledged the right to raise
one's children as an essential right. " Moreover, this right does not
derive solely from the blood relationship between the father and
child.'6 4 The unwed father must also actively participate in the upbringing of his child, or else he will lose this right.'"
The Court further explained the nature of constitutionally protected family relationships in Moore, in which it invalidated a local
zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from residing with
her two grandsons who were first cousins.'66 In affording constitutional protection to an extended family relationship, the Court explained that the Constitution prevented the state from imposing its
narrowly defined notion of family to infringe the associational rights
67
of close kin.'

The Court has implied that even the relationship between a foster parent and a foster child will also receive some measure of due
process protection. In Smith v. Organizationof Foster Families for
Equality and Reform ("OFFER"), the Court assumed, arguendo,
that the foster parent-child relationship was protected in upholding
a system for removing children from foster homes,' an assumption
disputed in concurring Court opinions.' " Moreover, in defining the
concept of family for substantive due process analysis, the Court
stated that while family implies a biological relationship, such a relationship is not the exclusive determination of a family's existence.170 The importance of familial relationships, both to the individual and to society, also stems from the emotional attachments
160.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
right to

405 U.S. 645 (1972).

Id.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Accord OFFER, at 843-44.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1976) (state may deny natural father
oppose adoption when father has never established home for the child or

otherwise been substantially involved in its upbringing).

166. 431 U.S. 494 (1972).
167. 167. Id. at 505-06.
168. OFFER, at 841-42, 856.
169.

Id. at 858 (Stewart, J., concurring) (interest asserted by foster parents not

of a kind that the Due Process Clause protects).
170. Id. at 843.
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that derive from the intimacy of daily association, as well as the role
these relationships play in promoting a way of life.'
Applying these principles to the relationships formed between a
contracting couple, the surrogate mother, and any child born of the
relationship, it is clear that the ties they share include characteristics of relationships to which the Court has extended constitutional
protection. The contracting couple usually shares a blood relationship with the child through the father's sperm."" Where the wife's
egg is fertilized in vitro and then implanted in the surrogate, both
parents share this blood relation.'13 Regardless of the degree of
blood relation, however, the contracting couple provides, as much as
possible, for the care and well being of the child during pregnancy
through the terms of its agreement with the surrogate, and the resources it makes available to her during pregnancy. 7 Also, the contracting couple plans from before conception on having a baby that
it will bring into its home to love and nurture, a promise that is
fulfilled at birth. Their ties to the child are not, therefore, anathema
to the institution of the family. On the contrary, they share many of
the characteristics of the relationships extended some form of constitutional protection in Moore, Stanley and OFFER. Moreover, the
presence of the third party in the person of the surrogate is not destructive of this relationship. Rather, her involvement is akin to that
of a midwife or an adoption agency, enabling persons who want to
form familial relationships to do so. Thus, because surrogate motherhood is itself supportive of the family relationships that the Constitution seeks to protect, the state cannot assert that it is necessary
to regulate surrogate motherhood as a means of promoting those
relationships.
3. Injury to the Parties
In promoting the general welfare, the state may exercise its police power to prevent some citizens from inflicting harm on others. 7 5
There is arguably a potential in the surrogate motherhood relationship for one of the parties to take advantage of the other. For example, a surrogate mother who, before conception, agreed to accept
$10,000 for her services might, upon the birth of the child, raise her
price in an effort to extort more money from the contracting
171. Id. at 844.
172. See supra text accompanying note 46 (describing injection of father's
sperm into surrogate).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 56 to 61 (describing the in vitro fertilization process).
174. See supra text accompanying note 10.
175. 175. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955).
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couple.1 76 As such, the state has an interest in regulating surrogate
motherhood to prevent the parties to a relationship from inflicting
harm upon one another.
Unlike the above-mentioned asserted state interests, the Court
has recognized that the state's interest in preventing harm to one or
more parties may be sufficient to justify infringing a fundamental
right. 7 Thus, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the
state may exercise its police power to regulate an abortion during
the second trimester of pregnancy as a means of protecting a pregnant woman from the physical harm the procedure poses.1 7 8 In such
regulation, the state infringes the woman's fundamental right to decide whether to give birth to a child. Implicit in this ruling is a balancing of the interests involved, in which the Supreme Court has
held that the state's interest in preventing physical harm to the woman during the second trimester outweighs her individual interest
in exercising her fundamental right.1 79 By analogy, insofar as the
state can identify a similar harm to any of the parties to the surrogate motherhood relationship, the state's interest in preventing that
harm would outweigh the couple's exercise of its fundamental right
of procreational autonomy. The state would, therefore, be justified
in regulating the surrogate motherhood relationship to prevent that
harm. In so doing, however, the Constitution would require the state
to employ a regulation that is narrowly drawn to achieve only this
end,' 80 and which does not otherwise burden the couple's exercise of
its fundamental right.
4. Best Interests of the Child
By involving the transfer of custody from the surrogate mother
to the contracting couple, surrogate motherhood affects the potential development of the child born from the relationship. The state,
under its parens patriae power, may protect or promote the welfare
of those, such as infants, who lack the capacity to act in their own
best interests.' 8' The state, therefore, has an interest in regulating
the surrogate motherhood relationship to promote the best interests
of any child born from that relationship.
The state may use its parens patriae power to interfere with
the right of parents to rear their children where it is necessary to do
so to protect the chld from physical or mental harm. Thus, the Su176.
177.
178.
179.

O'Brien, supra note 12, at 134 n.52.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
Id. at 163.
Id.

180. Id. at 155.
181. See, e.g., Adlington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (state may protect
those who are incompetent to protect themselves).
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preme Court upheld the right of the state to interfere as parens patriae to prevent a nine-year-old child from publicly distributing religious material under the direction of her mother in Prince v.
Massachusetts."2 The Court reasoned that such propagandizing
posed potentially harmful emotional, psychological, or physical injury to the child, justifying the state's intervention.18 3 By contrast,
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4 the Court held it was improper for the
state to intervene as parens patriae to require Amish children to
attend high school against the religious wishes of their parents. The
Yoder Court found that there was no proof that the decision of the
Amish parents not to send their children to secondary schools
caused any harm to the physical or mental health of their children,
as had taken place in Prince.85 Absent proof that the state is acting
to prevent physical or mental harm, the Court held that the state's
interest as parens patriae is not sufficient to outweigh the parent's
fundamental right to direct the religious upbringing of his children. ' 6 By analogy, therefore, the state may use its parens patriae
power to regulate the rights of the contracting parents to exercise
their fundamental right of procreational autonomy, but only insofar
as it is necessary to do so to prevent the child born of this relationship from suffering physical, emotional or psychological harm.
E. Regulating Payments to Surrogates: Least Restrictive Means
Analysis
Only the state's interest in preventing harm to the parties,187 or
to the child born of the relationship,' will outweigh the contracting
couples' interest in exercising their fundamental right to procreational autonomy, and thus justify state regulation of surrogate
motherhood to achieve these ends. To pass constitutional muster,
therefore, any regulation restricting the payment of funds to the
surrogate mother must seek to alleviate or prevent harm to the parties or the child, and be narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. If a
less restrictive means of infringing the parties' fundamental rights
would achieve this end equally well, the regulation will be stricken
on grounds that it is overly broad. 189
182.
183.
184.
185.

321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 169-70.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 229-30.

186. Id.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 174-179.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 180 to 185.
189. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (governmental interest cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved).
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1. Preventing Harm to the Surrogate: Least Restrictive Means
The existing laws preventing the payment of consideration in
conjunction with the relinquishment of parental rights are intended,
in part, to protect parents and children from the harms typically
associated with baby selling. 9 ' Surrogate motherhood, however,
shares little in common with the baby selling experience. These laws
are partially intended, for example, to prevent unscrupulous baby
brokers, operating on the black market, from taking advantage of
vulnerable mothers. Baby brokers typically prey upon young, unwed
mothers after they become pregnant or have already had their child,
and who, out of guilt, despair, or need, agree to give up their parental responsibilities over children they would otherwise have raised."9 '
Baby selling thus destroys existing familial relationships in order to
create others.
Surrogate motherhood, by contrast, does not involve these
harms to the surrogate. Instead, the surrogate makes a rational decision before the child is even conceived to have a baby for a couple
that is otherwise incapable of doing so.'2 Her decision is born not
out of desperation, but out of a decision made at arms-length to provide a service that will enable others to enjoy the responsibilities
and pleasures of being a parent.' 93 Moreover, were it not for the surrogate motherhood relationship, the child the surrogate carries
would never have otherwise been born. Thus, the surrogate sacrifices
none of her own plans to raise, nurture, and love a child for the sake
of the contracting couple.
One student commentator has argued that the commercialized
surrogate mother suffers the same threat of harm as the person who
donates an organ for pay.9 4 This harm consists in the physical detriment, permanence of loss, and risk of exploitation. Just as the federal government has prohibited the interstate sale of human organs
to prevent this harm, 99 so too, she argues, should the states prevent
commercialized surrogate motherhood.' The flaw in this argument
is that, while babies are unique, they are not analogous to non-re190. For a discussion of the harms baby selling causes, see Black Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48 (1976) (welfare of mother and baby subordinated to profit
nature of black market profiteer; promotes adoption system that favors rich; and creates moral problem). But cf. Landes and Posner, supra note 39 (advocating legalization of baby selling).
191. See Coleman, supra note 17, at 108-09 (arguing that while the black market for babies thrives on the shame, guilt or ignorance of unmarried mothers, and the
frustration, impatience and haste of childless couples).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 16.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 16.
194. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 142-43.
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247(e) (West. Supp. 1986).
196. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 142-43.
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generative body parts. After the surrogate mother leaves the delivery room she is, generally speaking, every bit as healthy as before
the process began. The man who donates a functioning eyeball for
transplantation is, by contrast, permanently scarred afterwards.
Thus, the surrogate mother is not being compensated to undergo
harm in the same way that an organ donor is.
Surrogate motherhood, however, does pose some risks for the
surrogate. For example, she may be physically incapable of surviving
a pregnancy,""' the contracting couple may renege on its promised
performance to her, or it may exert such influence over her as to
engage in exploitation. While a complete ban on payments to the
surrogate would greatly reduce the number of Women willing to
serve in that capacity"'8 and, thereby, "solve" these problems, means
less restrictive of the contracting couple's fundamental rights are
available to address these harms. To minimize the potential physical
harm to the surrogate, for example, the state could require her to
obtain a license, for which she would have to secure medical certification of her physical and emotional fitness to bear a child. 9' To
prevent the contracting couple from defrauding the surrogate, the
state could likewise impose a licensing requirement on them, for
which they would have to obtain a performance bond.2 0 0 To prevent
the couple from exercising undue influence over the surrogate, the
state could regulate the amount of money they could offer.2 0 ' Since
these less restrictive means are available to promote the state's interest in preventing harm to the surrogate mother, a complete ban
on payments to the surrogate is an overly broad means of achieving
this end and, therefore, is unconstitutional as applied for this
purpose.
2.

Protecting the Contracting Couple: Least Restrictive Means

The contracting couple also runs a risk of suffering harms as
well. These risks mainly derive from the possibility of non-performance on the part of the surrogate mother. She may refuse to accept
insemination, fail to obtain medical care, renege on her promise not
to abort the child, or refuse to relinquish parental rights to the child
once it is born.20 2 Refusing to perform in any of these manners can,
depending on what stage of the surrogate motherhood process it oc197.
198.
199.

See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
See supra text accompanying note 128.
Accord Coleman, supra note 17, at 118.

200. The bond would assure that the surrogate mother would recoup her fee in
the event that the contracting couple reneged.
201. An upper limit on the fee that the surrogate could receive would prevent
post-birth extortion.
202. See Coleman, supra note 17.
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curs, cause the contracting couple emotional and psychological
harm, as well as the loss of the monies that they have expended to
that point. These problems could be addressed through a state licensing scheme that would screen and counsel prospective surrogate
mothers to ensure their stability and willingness to perform, and
which would require each surrogate candidate to post a performance
bond to compensate the contracting couple in the event of non-performance. 0 3 This scheme would promote the state's interest in protecting the contracting couple from harm in a manner that is less
restrictive of the couple's constitutional rights than a complete prohibition on payments to the surrogate. Such a prohibition, thus, is
unconstitutional as an overly broad means of promoting the state's
interest in protecting the couple from harm.
3. Promoting the Best Interests of the Child: Least Restrictive
Means
Under its parens patriae power, the state may intervene to protect children from abuse or neglect. Laws barring the receipt or offer
of consideration in conjunction with the transfer of parental rights
are intended to serve this end. 04 The state has no guarantee that
the purchaser of parental rights is a fit parent, capable and willing
of providing the economic and emotional support the child needs. 0 5
The state thus steps in and demands that the parties show that the
transferral of rights is not exploitative and is in the best interests of
the child.
Where parental fitness is established, however, the courts have
traditionally had less problem with the introduction of compensation in conjunction with parental rights transfers. Thus, both the
Ninth Circuit " and the Kansas Supreme Court207 have upheld
agreements between close family members to transfer parental
rights in return for compensation where such transfers were in the
best interests of the child. 08 In transferring parental rights from the
203. Cf. supra note 199.
204. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
205. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (citing Virginia Supreme
Court's statement that the custody and welfare of children are not the subject of
barter).
206. Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank of Nevada, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975) (court
enforced agreement in which natural mother provided pre-birth consent to adoption
in return for natural father's promise to provide for natural mother in his will).
207. In re Shirk's Estate, 186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1960) (court enforced
agreement in which decedent agreed to devise one-third of her estate in return for her
daughter's promise to consent to the adoption of her daughter)
208. The Restatement of Contracts states: "A promise affecting the right of custody of a minor child is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the disposition as to custody is consistent with the best interests of the child." (emphasis
added). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1981).
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natural mother to the natural father, surrogate motherhood is arguably such an agreement between close family members.20 9 Thus,
the baby does not face the same threat of harm as he would in a
typical baby-selling scenario involving strangers. Additionally, the
state may use its existent adoption apparatus to further prequalify
the fitness of contracting couples as part of an overall licensing procedure it may impose on them.2 1 These actions achieve the state's
interest in protecting the best interests of the child without infringing upon the couple's fundamental right to procreate. Thus, a complete prohibition on payments to the surrogate would be overly
broad to achieve this end.
CONCLUSION

A married couple's decision to have a child through surrogate
motherhood is constitutionally protected under the right of privacy
from undue state infringement. Laws that prevent a married couple
from paying a surrogate for her services infringe this decision, and
thereby violate the married couple's right to privacy. The state's interest in protecting the parties to the surrogate motherhood relationship, and any child born from it, from harm, arguably justifies
this infringement. The state can protect these interests, however,
through means that do not infringe upon the married couple's fundamental rights. These include licensing, regulation, and bond requirements. A prohibition on payments to surrogates is, thus, unnecessary to achieve the state's compelling interests, and is therefore
an unconstitutional restriction on the married couple's right of
privacy.
Thomas S. Bradley

209. The contracting husband is usually the natural father of the child, and the
contracting wife may also be related by blood to the child. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20, 56-60.
210. For a discussion of adoption procedures, see CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
REALATIONS (1968). Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
1501 (1987).

